



u.s. monetary and fiscal policies have spillover
effects on foreign economies. How foreign policy
makers respond to these spillovers depends to a
large extent on business cycles abroad. For
example, when u.S. economic policies have
stimulative effects on foreign economies, foreign
policy makers are likely to seek to counteract the
stimulus if inflation abroad is a problem and to
welcome the transmitted stimulus if sluggish
growth is the concern.
This Letter discusses the foreign spillover effects
of u.s. policies and examines the historical
responses of foreign policymakers. Business
cycle conditions abroad appear to have shaped
the responses of foreign policymakers to changes
in U.S. interest rates and the value of the dollar.
Transmission of u.s. policy
Whether U.S. economic policies have an expan-
sionaryor a contractionary effect on foreign
economies depends on the nature of the policy
being pursued in the u.s. For example, consider
the effects of an expansionary U.s. fiscal policy.
Simple economic theory suggests that such a
policy has a clear stimulatory effect abroad. By
raising U.S. aggregate demand, interest rates,
and the value of the dollar, U.S. fiscal expansion
stimulates demand for foreign imports and boosts
foreign income.
The dollar's appreciation, moreover, reduces u.s.
international competitiveness and works to boost
demand for foreign goods. Thus in the case of
u.s. fiscal stimulus, the resulting income and
exchange-rate effects both work to .boost foreign
income. Indeed, most econometric models agree
that a U.S. fiscal expansion is expansionary
abroad.
In contrast, while tighter U.s. monetary policy
also raises U.S. interest rates, its effect on output
abroad is theoretically ambiguous. On the one
hand, tighter monetary policy works to raise
domestic interest rates and. lower U.s. spending.
The lower U.s. demand, by reducing import
demand and improving the U.S. current account,
reduces foreign output.
On the other hand,the higher interest rates also
attract capital inflows which appreciate the
dollar. The appreciation of the dollar, in turn,
diminishes U.S. international competitiveness,
weakening the demand for exports of u.s. goods
and stimulating imports of foreign goods. Conse-
quently, the exchange-rate channel helps to
stimulate foreign output. Thus, the income and
exchange-rate effects of tighter U.s. monetary
policy work in opposite directions on foreign
output.
Whether the income effect or the exchange-rate
effect dominates depends on the extent to which
interest rate changes affect the value of the
dollar. The greater is the degree of international
capital mobility, the greater will be the effects of
interest rate changes on the exchange rate and
the more likely is the exchange-rate effect to
dominate.
Simulations of a number of econometric models,
including the structural forecasting model used at
the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, indi-
cate that the exchange-rate effect does in fact
dominate the income effect, implying tighter U.s.
monetary policy stimulatesforeign output in the
long run. That is, the appreciation of the dollar
and corresponding depreciation of foreign cur-
rencies stimulate foreign income sufficiently to
offset the negative effects of the decline in U.s.
aggregate demand on imports from abroad.
In sum, rising U.s. interest rates, whether attri-
butable to tighter monetary policy or stimulatory
fiscal policy, are generally expansionary for
foreign economies. Conversely, declining U.s.
interest rates, whether from monetary policy ease
or tighter fiscal policy, are on balance contrac-
tionary abroad.
How will policy makers respond?
Foreign policy makers' response to u.s. policies
that cause u.s. interest rates to rise likely will
depend on economic conditions abroad. Clearly,
when foreign policymakers are concerned with
boosting output, they are more likely to be
receptive to the expansionary effects on theirFRBSF
economies of higher U.S. interest rates and a
stronger dollar. On the other hand, when they
are more concerned about excessive expansion
and inflation, they are more likely to pursue
policies to dampen these effects.
Using this reasoning, Chart 1 categorizes the
differentassociations between u.s. and foreign
interest rate movements depending on the pri-
mary policy concern of foreign policymakers.
The upper left-hand and lower right-hand boxes,
the "diagonal cases;' correspond to instances in
which foreign policy makers are likely to try to
dampen the transmitted effects of u.s. policies.
By raising or lowering their interest rates in tan-
dem with those of the United States, foreign
policymakers can dampen changes in the value
ofthe dollar and the associated spillover effects
for their economies.
Chart 1
Foreign Interest Rate Movements
from a comparison of real interest rate move-
ments, presented in Chart 2. The chart shows the
four-quarter moving average level of the short-run
real interest rate in the u.s. and the "rest ofthe
world:' The real interest measures were con-
structed by subtracting inflation rates over the
previous fouLquarters from the nominal 3-month
Treasury bill rate for the u.s. and from a weighted
average of the nominal interest rates for ten
major foreign countries, respectively.
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Historical behavior of'interest rates
Insight into the historical interdependence of
U.S. and foreign policy actions can be gained
The upper left-hand box, for example, shows that
when U.S. interest rates are rising and foreign
policy makers are concerned about inflation, for-
eign interest rates should rise as well. Conversely,
the lower-right hand box shows that when U.S.
interest rates are falling and foreign policy
makers are concerned with recession, foreign
interest rates should fall.
The lower left-hand and upper right-hand boxes,
the "opposing diagonal cases;' correspond to
instances in which foreign policymakers are
likely to welcome the transmitted effects of U.s.
policy and allow their interest rates to diverge
from those in the u.s. Byadjusting their policies
so as to move their interest rates in the opposite
direction from that of u.s. rates, they allow the
exchange values oftheir currencies to appreciate
if inflation is the concern or depreciate if reces-
sion is the concern abroad.
When U.S. Interest Rates Are:
A rough measure of business cycle conditions
abroad and therefore, foreign policy makers'
concerns during the period from 1975 to 1988
can be obtained by examining annual inflation
rates and the level of economic activity (meas-
ured by the level of "GNP gap," that is, the
percentage deviation of the trend level of output
from actual output) in the member countries of
the OECD (Organization of Economic Coopera-
tion and Development), excluding the U.S. This
examination suggests that foreign policymakers
primarily were concerned about boosting eco-
nomic activity in periods 1, 3, and 5 when the
output gap was relatively large. In contrast, the
As an overall observation, foreign interest rates
have tended to move in the same direction as
U.S. interest rates, except in subperiods 3 and 4
(1982-1983 and 1984-1986). The divergence in
rates during these two periods can be explained
by changes in business cycle conditions abroad
and foreign policy makers' concerns.
The graph divides the period from 1974 Q1 to
1989 Q2 into six subperiods. Over three of these
subperiods U.s. real interest rates generally have
fallen; these are 1974-1975, 1984-1986, and
1987. During the remaining three subperiods-
1976-1981,1982-1983, and 1988-1989-U.S.










Concern is with:focus was on containing inflation in periods 2, 4,
and 6 when the output gap was near zero or
negative (that is, the level of economic activity
was at or above trend).
Given this characterization of business cycle
conditions abroad and foreign policy makers'
concerns during each of the six subperiods de-
picted in Chart 2, it is clear that u.s. and foreign
interest rates have moved as Chart 1 would pre-
dict. In particular, foreign interest rates have risen
along with U.S. rates when outputand/orinfJa:
tion have been relatively high abroad (periods 2
and 6) and foreign policymakers have been con-
cerned about controlling inflation. In these
periods, they apparently preferred to dampen the
stimulatory effects of u.s. rate increases and an
appreciating dollar.
Likewise, foreign interest rates have fallen along
with U.s. interest rates when output abroad was
relatively low (period 1) and/or inflation was low
(period 5). In these periods, foreign policymakers
preferred to dampen the contractionary effects of
declining U.s. rates and a depreciating dollar.
Periods 2 and 6 correspond to the upper left-
hand box, while periods 1 and 5 correspond to
the lower right-hand box of Chart 1-the
diagonal cases.
In contrast, during the years 1982-1983 (period
3), foreign interest rates fell in response to a rise
in U.s. interest rates. Since the rest of the world
was experiencing relatively low inflation, with
output levels below trend, the divergence in rates
is consistent with a foreign preference for the
stimulus associated with rising U.S. rates and an
appreciating dollar. This corresponds to the lower
left-hand box in Chart 1.
During the period 1984-1986 (period 4), U.s.
interest rates were fall ing, but the net effect of
u.s. policies continued to be stimulatory abroad,
because the effects of the high dollar, which
continued to appreciate into 1985, were still felt
through 1986. Moreover, because the level of
foreign output moved closer to trend in this
period, foreign central banks chose to raise
interest rates somewhat to maintain control of
inflation. This corresponds to the upper right-
hand box in Chart 1.
Thus over the two periods 1982-1983 and 1984-
1986 foreign interest rates tended not to move
very c1oselywithUS. rates (and in fact generally
moved in the opposite direction), causing the
value of the dollar to change a great deal. In
these two opposing diagonal cases, as Chart 1
would predict, the desire of foreign policy
makers was to allow the dollar to change and
the effects of u.s. policies to spill over.
Implications
Currently, inflation is the major concern of
foreign economic policymakers. Projections for
the GECD (excluding the U.s.) are that consumer
prices will rise on average 4.5 percent in 1989,
ranging from two percent in Japan and three per-
cent in Germany to six percent in the U.K. and
Italy. Foreign monetary authorities, particularly in
Germany and Japan, consistently have expressed
low tolerance for further inflation. In addition,
output growth is now generally healthy and
output levels are above trend.
The recent rise in U.S. interest rates and appre-
ciation of the dollar has added to concerns about
further inflation abroad. In light of foreign busi-
ness cycle conditions, foreign policymakers are
likely to continue to resist any further stimulus to
their economies and raise their own interest rates
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